I. INTRODUCTION In MacDonald v. Moose, 1 a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to undo the state criminal conviction of an adult for soliciting oral sex from a minor.2 Based on Lawrence v. Texas, 3 the court held a longstanding Virginia prohibition of bestiality and sodomy to be partially facially unconstitutional. 4 Its decision left the bestiality prohibition untouched while holding the sodomy prohibition completely unenforceable, even as applied in cases involving minors. 5 The panel majority misapplied the deferential standard of review required by Congress for federal habeas review of state court convictions. 6 And the court's analysis further muddled the already confused doctrine surrounding facial and as-applied challenges. More fundamentally, the panel majority's concern about the supposed need to engage in a "drastic" "judicial reformation" of Virginia's law to render it compatible with Lawrence was simply misplaced. 7 The court could have-and should have-easily applied Virginia's law together with Lawrence, just as the Virginia courts did in the decade between Lawrence and MacDonald.
II. BACKGROUND
MacDonald v. Moose addressed the effect of Lawrence v. Texas on a Virginia statute criminalizing bestiality and sodomy. 8 William MacDonald was convicted in the Circuit Court of the City of Colonial Heights of soliciting a minor to violate Virginia's sodomy prohibition and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 9 At the time of the events giving rise to his prosecution (September of 2004), MacDonald was a forty-seven-year-old male and the minor was a seventeen-year-old female. 10 Putting aside the age difference for a moment and focusing just on the solicited act, MacDonald did not solicit what many people think of as a felony. He did not ask for help with robbing a bank or assaulting an enemy, but rather to perform oral sex.
11 Moreover, the minor said "no" and they did not then engage in oral sex.
12 It was only a few months later that MacDonald came to law enforcement's attention through an unusual combination of circumstances, and he was ultimately charged with and convicted of solicitation. 13 MacDonald's solicitation conviction was based on two Virginia laws: (1) the law prohibiting solicitation of a minor to commit a predicate felony 14 and (2) the law defining the predicate felony. 15 In MacDonald's case, the predicate felony was sodomy in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A): "If any person carnally knows in any manner any brute animal, or carnally knows any male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submits to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony .... "
16
Section 18.2-361(A)'s blanket prohibition of bestiality and sodomy was obviously unconstitutional in many of its potential applications after Lawrence.
17
In Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions of two adult men under a Texas law that prohibited sodomy between individuals of the same sex. In that earlier opinion, the Virginia Court of Appeals first rejected MacDonald's facial challenge on the ground that "a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights." 26 The court then rejected MacDonald's as-applied challenge on the ground that "Lawrence made quite clear that its ruling did not apply to sexual acts involving children."
27
In holding that Lawrence provides no constitutional protection for sodomy involving an adult and a minor, the Virginia Court of Appeals explained that Lawrence's inapplicability to "acts involving minors" was one of four exceptions to the Lawrence Court's holding: "The Supreme Court found that acts involving minors along with non-consensual acts, public conduct, and prostitution do not merit due process protection. Court for the Eastern District ofVirginia. 33 As construed by the district courtand as relevant to the ultimate disposition of the petition by the Fourth CircuitMacDonald claimed in his petition that section 18.2-361(A) of the Virginia Code was unconstitutional on its face and as aq~lied in his prosecution. 34 The district court disposed of the facial claim first. 5 The court reasoned that the state court's holding that MacDonald "lacked standing to challenge the facial constitutionality of ... [section] 18.2-361(A)" was not contrary to federal law because "the principle relied upon was drawn directly from a United States Supreme Court case." 36 The district court next disposed of the as-applied claim, 37 stating that because "Virginia considers persons aged sixteen and seventeen to be children, and the Supreme Court in Lawrence explicitly stated that the ruling did not apply to sexual acts involving children," the state court holding was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. The panel majority first rejected the state court's reliance on the principle that a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it affects the party's own rights. 42 The court reasoned that this principle was inapplicable because the statute's facial unconstitutionality entailed its as-applied unconstitutionality. 45 The panel majority explained Bowers as a failed facial challenge to a Georgia statute virtually identical to Virginia's; 46 in concluding that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today," the Lawrence Court "recognized that the facial due process challenge in Bowers was wrongly decided."
47 According to the majority, the similarities between the Georgia statute incorrectly upheld in Bowers and the Virginia statute underlying MacDonald's conviction required a holding of facial unconstitutionality in MacDonald's case: "Because the invalid Georgia statute in Bowers is materially indistinguishable from the anti-sodomy provision being challenged here, the latter provision likewise does not survive the Lawrence decision."
48
The court also reasoned that judicial narrowing of the sodomy prohibition to apply only to minors would require forbidden judicial rewriting of the statutes. 49 The majority acknowledged that a more narrowly drawn sodomy prohibition might be constitutional, but stated that the task of narrowing in these circumstances was for the state legislature, not a federal court. 50 Although the Supreme Court has stated that the preferred remedy is "to enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications in force," this sort of remedy has a limit: courts should not rewrite state law even as they attempt to salvage it. 51 The panel majority reasoned that "a judicial reformation of the anti-sodomy provision to criminalize MacDonald's conduct in this case, and to do so in harmony with Lawrence, requires a drastic action that runs afoul" of this principle.
52
Judge Diaz's dissent emphasized the deferential standard of review that a federal court must apply in reviewing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 53 The dissent opened with Judge Diaz's assessment that the state court's determination that Lawrence "invalidated sodomy laws only as applied to private consenting adults" was not "so lacking in justification that 44 there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." 54 The dissent next explained that the two grounds relied upon by the majority for rejecting an as-applied interpretation of Lawrence were unpersuasive. 55 The majority's reliance on the overruling of Bowers, which the panel described as a failed facial challenge, was a "stretch."
56 According to Judge Diaz, the court should not have assumed "that the Virginia General Assembly did not intend for its anti-sodomy provision to apply to the conduct that Lawrence arguably exempted from constitutional .
,,57
protect10n.
IV. ANALYSIS
Judge Diaz's dissent was correct in its able elaboration of various ways in which the majority's analysis failed to abide by the deferential standard of review for federal habeas review of state court convictions. 58 As he noted, the crux of the state court's reasoning in MacDonald's case was that "Lawrence did not facially invalidate all sodomy statutes, but rather only the ar plication of such statutes to private, consensual sexual activity among adults." (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the majority did not explicitly acknowledge the dissent's formulation of the standard, this formulation correctly states the Supreme Court's binding doctrine interpreting the statutory standard ofreview. See, e.g., Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87 ("As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling ... was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.").
55. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 168 (Diaz, J., dissenting). 56. Id. at 169 ("If it is difficult to discern from the Lawrence opinion whether it invalidated all sodomy statutes, it is even more of a stretch to do so by negative inference from the case it overturned.").
57. 60. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (noting that the "case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions"); see id. at 564 ("We conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution."); see also id. at 572 (observing that "liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex"); id. at 578 (stating that petitioners' "right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government").
reasoning was right, only whether it was reasonable. 61 The applicable statutory standard of review required an inquiry into whether the state court decision "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 62 Noting what he called "the opaque language of Lawrence," Judge Diaz observed that "[r]easonable jurists could disagree on whether Lawrence represented a facial or an as-applied invalidation of the Texas sodomy statute." 63 And Judge Diaz's observation was plainly accurate. 64 Although Judge Diaz did not analyze the majority's discussion of facial versus as-applied invalidation in much depth, his principal observation on this point was devastating. Recall how the panel majority dealt with the Virginia court's application of the unremarkable rule that a litigant generally cannot bring a facial challenge against a statute that is constitutional as applied to that litigant. 65 The panel majority said this was beside the point because the antisodomy provision was unconstitutional as applied to MacDonald-a conclusion that followed from the panel majority's determination that the anti-sodomy provision was facially unconstitutional. 66 As Judge Diaz pointed out, "this analysis is circular."
67
Judge Diaz went on to say that the standing-to-raise-a-facial-challenge principle did not matter in this case because the issue boiled down to the question "whether Lawrence invalidated sodomy statutes on an as-applied or facial basis."
68 Although Judge Diaz was right about the limited consequences of the panel majority's circular reasoning for this particular case, that reasoning nevertheless has the potential to cause confusion in future cases through its muddling of facial challenge doctrine. 69 To illustrate, consider the Fourth Circuit's decision in Woollard v. Gallagher, 70 decided less than two weeks after MacDonald. In Woollard, the Fourth Circuit addressed a Second Amendment challenge to a Maryland gunpermitting requirement that required an applicant to show a "good and substantial reason" to be able to carry a gun outside the applicant's home. 71 The district court in Woollard held that this good-and-substantial-reason requirement was facially unconstitutional. 72 But the Fourth Circuit approached it quite differently. In addition to rejecting Woollard's claim that the permitting requirement was unconstitutional as applied to him, the court held that Woollard lacked standing to bring his facial challenge: "Because we conclude that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement is constitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to Appellee Woollard, we also must reject the Appellees' facial challenge."
73
According to the Fourth Circuit panel in Woollard, the Supreme Court has instructed that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court."
74
This principle is the same principle applied by the Virginia Court of Appeals in MacDonald's case. 75 But the reasoning in the two Fourth Circuit cases is inconsistent.
76
And the inconsistency cannot be attributed to one panel's unfamiliarity with the other panel's reasoning as the two cases made their way through the decisional process. Woollard and MacDonald were argued before the Fourth Circuit on the same day, 77 and two out of the three judges presided in both cases: Judge King and Judge Diaz.
78
Most importantly, Judge King authored both opinions.
79
[VOL. 65: 951 It is far from clear why the appellees in Woollard could not have made the same move endorsed by Judge King's panel majority opinion in MacDonald to seek an initial determination of facial unconstitutionality. 80 That is, after all, the determination the district court made in Woollard. 81 Based on MacDonald, the appellees in Woollard could have simply argued that advancing a facial challenge was one of their grounds for seeking as-applied relief. To point out the availability of this move is not to endorse it, of course, but rather to show that it was a mistake for the panel majority to make the move available in MacDonald.
The MacDonald dissent's second principal criticism of the panel majority opinion-that the majority misapplied Ayotte-is also well-founded. 82 The dissent argued that a proper application of Ayotte would have permitted the continued enforceability of the anti-sodomy provision in circumstances not db L ' . 83 covere y awrence s reasonmg. Instead of treating section 18.2-361(A) of the Virginia Code as partially facially unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit should have treated it as the Virginia courts did: unenforceable in those circumstances in which its enforcement would infringe on the personal liberty interests recognized in Lawrence, but otherwise enforceable. 84 Apart from resting on its mistaken reading of Lawrence, the panel also reasoned that this "judicial reformation of the anti-sodomy provision" would be "a drastic action that runs afoul of the Supreme Court's decision inAyotte." 85 In Ayotte, however, the Supreme Court directed that federal courts crafting remedies for partially unconstitutional statutes should generally try "to limit the solution to the problem," such as by "enjoin[ing] only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications in force." 86 The Court did add that federal courts should not implement this general preference for limited relief when crafting such relief would require "making distinctions in a murky constitutional context, or where line-drawing is inherently complex."
87
And this is the part of Ayotte that the majority in MacDonald thought that anything other than partial facial invalidation would run afoul of. 88 majority was wrong because Lawrence was clear about the limits of its holding.
89 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court identified four such limits: the protected conduct in Lawrence was (1) consensual, (2) noncommercial, (3) private, and ( 4) between two adults. 90 The Virginia courts easily identified these limits after Lawrence, as did many other courts.
91
These are also precisely the limits contained in a failed legislative fix for Lawrence in Virginia-a fix that may have failed because the bill also would have reduced the seriousness of the offense. 92 
93
The job of the court was not to figure out whether Lawrence required taking anything out of section 18.2-361(A), but rather, how to apply both that statute and Lawrence.
To recognize that the superior law of the Constitution as set forth in Lawrence would limit the application of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A), it would not have been necessary for the judiciary to write words into the statute (actually or metaphorically). To see why, consider some other examples. A state statute does not have to recite that it is unenforceable in circumstances outside the state's legislative jurisdiction; the limits oflegislative jurisdiction are background rules of legislation. A legislature does not have to rewrite its longarm statute to specify that it does not apply to circumstances in which the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the statute would violate due process. And so on. 94 Similarly, the Virginia legislature did not have to write into its statute that it would be unenforceable in circumstances in which its enforcement would violate the Constitution. That is a background rule of our legal system that operates of its own force. The panel majority's concerns about judicial rewriting in MacDonald v. Moose were simply misplaced.
V. CONCLUSION
Right or wrong, the panel majority's conv1ct10ns about the partial facial unconstitutionality of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A) carried the day. The Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en bane and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 95 While this additional federal appellate consideration was taking place, discussions about MacDonald v. Moose spilled over into the 2013 Virginia gubernatorial campaign. 96 A case that began as a straightforward appeal from the denial of habeas relief turned into a political beach ball batted around by both campaigns and a source of late night humor.
97
With the campaign spectacles now but a memory, the principles of law formulated and applied in MacDonald v. Moose continue to govern in the Fourth Circuit. And that is why it remains worthwhile to subject the decision to careful criticism. The principles that matter the most, however, are not those specific to the interpretation and application of Lawrence v. Texas and Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A). The fate of this one statutory provision under that one case is much less important than the understanding of judicial review that erroneously led to its partial facial invalidation.
